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Introduction 
 There are currently 18 female world leaders and half of them are the first woman 
to hold their country’s highest office.1  Most countries have never had a female leader, 
but as the number of women entering politics around the world grows, this will likely 
change for many countries.  Women in world leadership are not unheard of historically, 
but it has always been rare.  A growing belief in gender equality marks a significant 
departure from traditional definitions of citizenship and eligibility to run for public office.  
In this modern world, a woman is more able to be a president, prime minister, or 
chancellor than ever.   
 This research is in the fields of political science and gender studies.  While gender 
studies applies to the study of both men and women, this research focuses on women 
because there is a need for systematical knowledge about women in world politics, as 
they are understudied and pose puzzles for the existing scholarship, which has focused on 
men. Traditionally, men have been the subjects of political science research.  Political 
science in general has usually lacked gender analyses, so it is unclear how well existing 
scholarship applies to women.2  This research aims to contribute to the study of female 
heads of state and government, in part because it is important in itself, as a component of 
political science and gender equality, but also because so little research has been 
dedicated to this group.  This gap in the literature is partly because there have been so 
few female heads of state and government, especially beyond temporary, ceremonial, or 
hereditary roles, and partly because most of the research on women in politics has 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Lauren Kent. ‘Number of Women Leaders around the World Has Grown, but They’re Still a 
2 Torild Skard. Women of Power: Half a Century of Female Presidents and Prime Ministers 
Worldwide, Translation: 2014 ed. (Great Britain: Policy Press, n.d.). 
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focused on elected women in parliaments or other elected bodies.3  For this reason, this 
paper studies only female cases. 
This paper seeks to address the question, “How do women negotiate international 
crisis and what are their outcomes?”  To do this, I derive hypothesis from both the realist 
and feminist theories to test in three case studies of prominent women leaders in the 20th-
21st centuries. I analyze qualitative case studies on Margaret Thatcher, Dilma Rousseff, 
and Angela Merkel, in which I test variation in negotiation style affecting outcomes.  I 
find that Merkel and Rousseff embraced collaborative approaches, while Thatcher 
consistently used a confrontational approach.  I also find that collaborative approaches 
tend to result in better outcomes for all parties, while a confrontational approach creates 
winners and losers. Overall, this offers more support for feminist theory than realist 
theory. 
 I begin this analysis by reviewing the existing literature on realism, feminist 
theory in political science, and negotiation styles.  Second, I explain the methodology and 
case selection for analyzing three female world leaders—Margaret Thatcher, Dilma 
Rousseff, and Angela Merkel.  In these in-depth case studies, I assess their overall 
negotiation style by looking at the psychology of their early influences and their 
international reputations.  Then I select a crisis negotiation and assess whether these 
women used collaborative or confrontational negotiation styles in a crisis negotiation.  
The specific negotiations within the cases are Margaret Thatcher over the Falklands, 
Dilma Rousseff over the NSA spying scandal, and Angela Merkel over the Ukraine 
Crisis.  Finally, I address implications of the study, identify areas of future study, and 
draw conclusions.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Skard 3. 
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Literature Review 
Where did male dominance come from? 
 Anthropologists have come to a consensus that, “In all known human societies, 
gender provides the basis for a fundamental division of social functions”, although the 
degree to which this led to subordination of women varies greatly.  Rosaldo and 
Lemphere conclude that no anthropologists have observed a society in which the power 
and authority of women was recognized to surpass that of the men.4  Skard notes that, 
“Everywhere, we find that women are excluded from certain crucial economic and 
political activities, that their roles as wives and mothers are associated with fewer powers 
and prerogatives than are the roles of men”.  Rosaldo and Lemphere concur that “sexual 
asymmetry is presently a universal fact of human social life” although, Skard notes that 
this asymmetry is a “cultural product” that can change.5  In short, cultures in every 
continent and across all time have tended to subordinate women to men, especially in 
terms of political power. 
Despite this pervasive subordination, throughout history there have been women 
who ruled, exerted considerable power and influence, and held positions of veneration in 
their societies.  The majority of recorded female rulers were in Europe.  There were at 
least 150 Egyptian queens and Egyptian women enjoyed a period of high status that 
lasted thousands of years.6  Many ethnic groups in Central and West Africa had female 
chiefs or leaders and many women fought in wars against colonialists.  China has a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Louise Lamphere and Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo, Woman, Culture, and Society (United States: 
Stanford University Press, 1974). 
5 Skard 56. 6!Ibid.!
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history of some very strong Empresses and concubines and in the Islamic world there 
were periods of females inheriting their rule. 
Colonialization, and the imposition of patriarchal European hierarchy across the 
globe weakened the rights and societal position of women.  Unfortunately, this especially 
applied to regions where women had particularly high positions, and women were further 
subordinated.  Since this colonial era, women’s resistance movements have grown, 
especially in the struggle for suffrage.  
Since then, the world has experienced three “waves” of feminism.  The first 
aimed to achieve recognition of equal rights, with a focus on suffrage.  The second wave 
further demanded equal rights and treatment, and was marked by the emergence of the 
study of gender as a social construct.  Skard notes that, “Many women’s activists stressed 
that personality characteristics and the behavior of women and men were little, if at all, 
constrained by biology. ‘Gender’, as distinct from biological sex, was defined as the set 
of social meanings attached to the categories of male and female”.7  Additionally, a focus 
on changing the patriarchy developed.  Progress was made in the United Nations, which 
adopted a World Plan of Action to support women’s advancement.  Third wave feminism 
saw the breakdown of gender categories, as the understanding of gender has become 
more fluid leading to the rise of mutliperspectivism, inclusivity, and intersectionality.8  
The feminist movement has grown globally and although there is no single definition of 
feminism, the common elements are a belief in the equality of women and men, a 
commitment to ending gender-based discrimination, subordination, and injustices. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Skard 58. 
8 Snyder, R. Claire. 2008. “What Is Third!wave Feminism? A New Directions Essay”. Signs 34 
(1). University of Chicago Press: 175–96. doi:10.1086/588436. 176. 
! 8!
The feminist movement has had a noticeable impact on the role of the state.  
Skard notes that, “Women’s movements challenged the conventional notions of ‘politics’ 
as first and foremost the management of the state and the economy” because many of the 
pressing issues for women were more intimate and about power-relations.9  Feminism has 
essentially helped extend the role of the state into social issues.  For example, feminism 
has raised issues of reproductive rights, sexual orientation, and gender-based violence in 
the political sphere. 
 
Political Theory and Gender 
Research into gender differences in political science has centered over the ‘nature 
vs. nurture’ debate.  Traditionally, theorists have argued that biological differences make 
women better suited to domestic roles to create a justification for excluding women from 
public life.  This argument is as old as political theory itself.  Liz Sperling notes that the 
“characteristic of all the states that Plato and Aristotle perceived as in some way better 
than others, is that they were all ruled by males”.10  She notes that Plato uses female 
gendered language for undesirable qualities in political leadership and that Aristotle 
“unashamedly assigns women a supporting role”.11  Sperling argues, “Just as Aristotle 
noted that women can only ever belong to the part of society which is ruled, the 17th 
century, patriarchal family in which women were permanently ruled, was effectively 
construed as a ‘natural hierarchy’ by Hobbes and Locke” in order to solidify the logic of 
a social contract to the hierarchy of the monarchy.12  Furthermore, Rousseau argues in his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Skard 67. 
10 Sperling 81. 
11 Sperling 82. 
12 Sperling 100. 
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treatise on education that, “Only men could learn to control their natures and to reason 
universally in order to contribute to the sovereign general will; women, due to their 
innate nature, could not be educated sufficiently to permit them the responsibility of 
citizenship, or trained to apply their skills and abilities to anything beyond their own 
purview”.  He allows that women can be educated to provide for the wellbeing of 
children in the state.  These political philosophers are the foundation for modern political 
science and their misogynistic visions of the state continue to influence political theory.  
As Chris Corrin notes, “Ideas and ideologies about women have been manufactured by 
male theorists in support of supposedly ‘neutral’ arguments about why women should 
remain subservient and not become full citizens exercising power”.13 
 
Gender Stereotypes 
Skard furthers this argument. She argues that the creation of gender stereotypes is 
also used as a justification for ideologies that “systematically support the allocation of 
unequal states, resources, and power to the two genders”.14  This creates a reinforcing 
cycle that socializes gender stereotypes in order to “facilitate men’s access to power”, 
while hindering women’s access.  By assigning traits associated with nurturing to women 
and traits associated with power to men, a division of labor is created that places men at 
the apex of power, as well as in the “productive sector”, while women have a harder time 
reaching top positions and are generally clustered in the “social sector” of government.15  
In practice this means that there are fewer women at top leadership levels in government 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Corrin 3. 
14 Skard 69. 
15 Ibid. 
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and across levels of the hierarchy, women are less likely to be found in positions of 
national security, the economy, and so on. 
One persistent example of this type of division of labor is the debate over women 
in military roles.  Cynthia Enloe argues that those involved in militarizing a society 
(military leaders) care about controlling women and their roles because, “Militarizers 
seem to believe that if women cannot be controlled effectively, men’s participation in the 
militarizing enterprise cannot be guaranteed”.16  This belief leads military leaders to 
create policies that are designed to promote soldiered masculinity.  This means defining 
female roles to facilitate an unquestioned hierarchy based on masculinity.  For example, 
during World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army forced Japanese women and girls into 
sexual slavery as “comfort women” as a means to prevent discontent soldiers from 
revolting.17  American officials in World War II also engaged in efforts to create 
“racialized, military prostitution systems” by organizing segregated brothels in Hawaii, 
Germany, Korea, Japan, and even France, which American soldiers were liberating from 
Nazi rule. 18   Enloe argues that all housing, curfew, civilian hiring, commercial, 
prostitution, STD medical, marriage, sexuality, and race policies of militaries need to be 
examined for their gendered intents and consequences, especially in areas that are 
integral to international security politics where military leaders are more willing to make 
sacrifices in the name of security.  
One of the reasons that there are so few women who reach the rank of president, 
prime minister, or the equivalent is because the recruitment systems are set up to favor !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Cynthia H. Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s 
Lives (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000). 294. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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men.  Separate studies by Tripp, Genovese, and Jalalzai all show that women tend to take 
different paths to executive power, such as through inheriting power, as outsiders who 
had not participated rise from inside the political system, or as women who rose at times 
when political and social institutions were weakened by unusual circumstances.19,20,21 In 
other words, of female chief executives, fewer are political insiders than of male leaders, 
meaning they generally come to power outside of the traditional recruitment system. 
The recruitment system that best excludes women is the one that is most based on 
gender stereotypes.  Feminists, such as Ann Tickner, argue that the debate over whether 
women are more peaceful than men actually leads to rationalizing the oppression of 
women and their exclusion from political rights and leadership. 22   The biological 
arguments in international relations scholarship can dangerously lead prejudiced 
justifications for excluding women. Francis Fukuyama’s article, “Women and the 
Evolution of World Politics”, theorizes a future world run by women, where aggressive 
male instincts are tamed to promote liberal democracy, based on biological evidence of 
male chimpanzees as more violent and aggressive.23  Tickner critiques Fukuyama arguing 
that, “Fukuyama tells us that no matter how attractive it may seem, we should not move 
further toward this feminized world; instead, we must keep things the way they are—with 
strong men at the helm. He argues that women are not able to deal with today’s threats 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Aili Mari Tripp, ‘Critical Perspectives on Gender and Politics: What Does the Rising Tide of 
Women in Executive Office Mean?’, Politics & Gender 4 (2008). 
20 Farida Jalalzai, ‘Shattered, Cracked, or Firmly Intact? Women and the Executive Glass Ceiling 
Worldwide by Farida Jalalzai’, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 36, no. 2 (April 3, 2015),  
21 Michael A. Genovese and Janie S. Steckenrider, eds. Women as Political Leaders: Studies in 
Gender and Governing. United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis, 2013. 
22 Ann J Tickner, Why Women Can’t Rule the World: International Politics according to Francis 
Fukuyama, (n.p., 1999). 381. 
23 Francis Fukuyama. ‘Women and the Evolution of World Politics’. Foreign Affairs. September 
1998.  
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that come from violent leaders, such as Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, and 
Mobutu Sese Seko”.24 For this reason, Tickner argues that, “Preferred futures are not 
feminized, but ones in which women and men participate in reducing damaging and 
unequal hierarchical social structure, such as gender and race”.25  Therefore, it is 
important to distinguish between oversimplifying gender stereotypes and ways in which 
men and women can both contribute to making the world a more peaceful place. 
 
Impact of Women 
This all leads to the question of whether the differences between men and women 
matter in international politics.  While there has been less research on world leaders, the 
impact of women in organizations, whether elected political bodies or business 
corporations, can be assessed.  In a 1977 breakthrough study, Rosabeth Moss Kanter 
found that in business corporations a critical mass of approximately 35% representation 
of women in a group or organization was needed for women to make an impact on the 
culture and be able to organize amongst themselves as a social force.26  In corporations, 
groups, and organizations with less than 35%, women became “tokens” that were 
identified within a gender stereotype, such as “mother”, “iron maiden”, “seductress”, or 
“pet”, and they were treated differently than the men. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Tickner. ‘Why Women Can’t Rule the World’. 382. 
25 Tickner. ‘Why Women Can’t Rule the World’. 383. 
26 Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation (New York, New York: Basic 
Books, 1983). 
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Institutions & Behavior 
Skard argues that institutions play a large role in influencing the political behavior 
of early entrants to the political system, but this raises the question of whether institutions 
or behavior comes first.  Skard argues: 
If women politicians want to succeed in male-dominated political institutions and 
have a career, they are usually obliged to accept the dominant male culture and 
become ‘one of the boys’. In particular, the first women to enter such institutions 
have to adjust their behavior to that of the majority.27   
 
Female politicians assimilate to a male culture in order to succeed.  In many cases, for the 
first women, the institutions may change them before they can change the institution.  
They adopt the dominant male language, way of thinking, and priorities.  One critique of 
this view is that early female entrants to a male-dominated system are the “type” of 
woman who self-selects into the male dominant culture.  Therefore, it is not the 
institutions that shape their political behavior, but rather that these women are more 
willing to accept the existing way of doing things because it attracted them in the first 
place.  One area in which both perspectives agree is that women who enter the political 
system earlier are usually more aligned with the traditional political culture and priorities, 
while women who come later tend to diverge from the traditional male culture. 
   However, some scholars have argued that these socialized or biological gender 
differences can be transformative for the state.  In her critique of Morgenthau’s 
“Principles of Political Realism”, Ann Tickner observed that women “are rarely to be 
found in positions of military leadership or at the top of the foreign policy 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Skard 79. 
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establishment”28.  However, this may not be optimal for the state because Tickner 
explains by using Carol Gilligan’s critique of Lawrence Kohlberg’s stages of morality 
that men tend to think in terms of the abstract and women tend to think in a contextual 
and narrative mode.  According to Tickner, in international security, the abstract way of 
thinking about morality detracts from our ability to tolerate cultural differences and to 
seek potential for building community in spite of these differences.  Tickner argues that 
this means that men tend to think abstractly about pursuing state power and interests, 
which may justify more aggressive behavior, while women might think more 
contextually and tolerate differences more, leading to more peaceful behavior. 
 
Causes of War and Gender 
Throughout the history of International Relations academia, scholars have desired 
to understand the causes of war.  Many have argued that conflict has roots in human 
nature and it is therefore impossible to prevent our aggressive instincts from resulting in 
conflict.  The original argument for this came from the English philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes in his 1651 book, Leviathan, which continues to have a major legacy for the 
study of conflict.  In the Hobbesian construction of human nature, people are initially 
stuck in the “state of nature” in which life is “nasty, brutish, and short” because men must 
use violence to protect and advance themselves. 29   People escape this state by 
covenanting to create Leviathan, or a State to govern, reward, punish, and restrict its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Ann Tickner, ‘Hans Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist 
Reformulation’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 17, no. 3 (December 1, 1988), 
doi:10.1177/03058298880170030801. 
29 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (n.p.: Peter Smith Pub, 1953). 
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subjects from violence against each other.  Implicit in this argument is that aggression is 
both natural and inevitable because the State exists to minimize violence.   
More recently, research has progressed to study the mind and the body, and academics 
continue to point to human nature as aggressive.   
In 1961, Sigmund Freud made a very influential argument in his psychoanalysis 
theory about sex and aggression.  Freud argues that within a person, the ego seeks to 
restrain the id because its demands are naturally narcissistic and aggressive.  He states 
that, “In circumstances that are favorable to [aggression], when the mental counter-forces 
(ego) which ordinarily inhibit it are out of action, it also manifests itself spontaneously 
and reveals man as a savage beast” (Freud/Bender 37).30  He suggests that group conflict 
also results from this failure to control our natural id urges once we have formed groups.  
In Freud’s opinion this is a natural outcome because,  “The advantage which a 
comparatively small cultural group offers of allowing this instinct an outlet in the form of 
hostility against intruders is not to be despised.  It is always possible to bind together a 
considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to 
receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness” (Freud/Bender 40). 
In 1968, Anthony Storr similarly argued that human aggression must result from 
internal, physiological causes in the same way as hunger.  He states, “There can be no 
doubt that men enjoy the enlivening effect of being angry when they can justify it, and 
that they seek out opponents whom they can attack” (Storr/Bender 20).  Storr suggests 
that anger is a physiological drive that requires expression, much in the same way as 
sexual drives.  After all, he argues that, “No other vertebrate habitually destroys members 
of his own species” (Storr/Bender 17).  The research into physiology, biology, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30  
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genetics has progressed to such an extent in the almost 50 years since Freud and Storr’s 
argument, that some scientists actually believe that war can be eradicated by removing 
certain genes from our DNA 
Tellingly, whenever these scholars argue for the innate instinct of aggression in 
human nature, they only write that “man” or “men” are naturally aggressive and violent.  
It almost appears as if they do not remember that women’s physiology should be included 
in discussions of human nature if the goal is an accurate and valid theory. 
 
Realist & Feminist Theories 
 These viewpoints of aggression as natural have tended to converge in the realism 
school of thought.  Realists assert that objective laws that result from an immutable 
human nature govern international security.  Hans Morgenthau popularized realism, 
which came to be the dominant theory among international relations scholars in the inter-
war years.  One area of particular interest in realism literature is the importance given to 
the definition and pursuit of power.  The traditional view in realism is that states will 
pursue their “interest defined by power”, where these interests are objective and 
universally valid.  Morgenthau argues that these interests “infuse rational order” into 
politics, making it possible to have a theoretical understanding of politics based on 
rational, objective, and unemotional thinking.  The outcome of this way of thinking is the 
belief that all states will pursue their interests in order to maximize their relative power in 
all favorable situations.  Although not explicitly stated, this is implies that all states are 
innately aggressive, and use this aggression to strategically gain more power. 
! 17!
 In response to Morgenthau, Ann Tickner addressed how the premises of realism 
assume male actors operating in a male-only international system.  Tickner examines 
Morgenthau’s six principles of realism, which are generally regarded as the foundation of 
international relations from a critical feminist perspective.  Morgenthau’s six principles 
are: 
1. Objective laws that have their roots in human nature govern politics. 
2. Interest is defined in terms of power. 
3. Interest defined as power is an objective category, which is universally valid, but 
not fixed. 
4. Universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states abstractly. 
5. The moral laws that govern the universe are distinct from, and do not govern, the 
state. 
6. The difference between political realism and other schools is real and profound.31 
 
Tickner reformulates these principles from a feminist perspective: 
1. Objective laws of human nature are based on a partial, masculine view when in 
reality human nature contains elements of social reproduction & development 
along with political domination.   This view is called dynamic objectivity, which 
is more connected and has less potential for domination 
2. National interest is multidimensional and contextually contingent, rather than 
defined solely by power.  It demands cooperative rather than zero sum solutions 
to problems like nuclear war, economic wellbeing, and the environment. 
3. Power cannot have a universally valid meaning.  Power defined by domination 
ignores collective empowerment. 
4. Moral command cannot be separated from political action. All political action has 
moral consequences 
5. Seek to find common moral elements in human aspirations that could become the 
basis for deescalating international conflict and building international community 
6. The “autonomy” of the political posited by Morgenthau is rejected because it is 
associated with a masculine view in western culture.  Efforts to construct a 
worldview should rest on a pluralistic conception of human nature that 
encompasses the masculine and feminine.  This ensures that contributions of 
women can be included.32 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Hans Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations. n.p.: McGraw Hill, 1948.  
32 Ann Tickner, ‘Hans Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist 
Reformulation’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 17, no. 3 (December 1, 1988),  
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According to Tickner, these differences have significant implications for the modern 
understanding of the international system and realism.  For example, accounting for 
dynamic objectivity, contextual and perceived national interests, opportunities for 
collective empowerment rather than domination, and a more inclusive understanding of 
morality in international politics, from both the male and female perspectives, can better 
allow scholars to understand world leaders and their approaches to international relations.  
Tickner’s feminist additions provide a real opportunity to determine whether gender 
differences in conflict negotiation, based around collective empowerment, lead to better 
outcomes for all parties involved.  This would be a significant departure from 
Morgenthau’s realism, which would predict that leaders’ pursuits of power and national 
interests will create winners and losers.  
 
Negotiation  
 Much research has focused on gender differences in negotiation, especially in the 
corporate sector.  In a meta-analysis of gender differences in negotiation, Stuhlmacher 
and Waters find that men tend to negotiate better outcomes for themselves and tend to 
negotiate more frequently than women.33   Babcock et al. find that women tend to avoid 
negotiations, which leads to less frequent advancement.34  Stuhlmacher and Waters 
identify three explanations for these gender differences in negotiation; women are 
socialized to focus on the needs of others rather than promote their own, companies may 
inadvertently penalize women who do negotiate, dissuading others, and when women get !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Alice Stuhlmacher and Amy Walters. ‘Gender Differences in Negotiation Outcome: A Meta-
Analysis’. Personnel Psychology 52, no. 3 (September 1999): 653–77. 
34 Linda Babcock, Sara Laschever, Michele Gelfand, and Deborah Small. Nice Girls Don’t Ask. 
n.p.: Harvard Business Review, 2003.  
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a better offer, they’re more likely to quit rather than leverage it in a salary negotiation.35  
Hannah Bowles adds that women tend to get “stuck in a double bind” if they initiate 
negotiations because they are perceived as “overly demanding”, while their male 
counterparts are not.36   
Bowles also finds that women negotiate better when gender stereotypes about 
negotiations, such as men being assertive and women being communal, are removed from 
the context and when women negotiate on behalf of others.37  Recent research furthered 
these findings and shown that women tend to take a more collaborative approach to 
negotiating and tend to be perceived as more collaborative.38  This approach involves 
making a stronger effort to listen and understand the needs of all parties involved, rather 
than a focus on trying to “win” the negotiation.  For example, Ifat Maoz conducted an 
experiment testing whether subjects would value compromises proposed by a female 
opponent more than the same proposal from a male opponent and whether subjects would 
perceive females as more warm and trustworthy.39  Maoz found support for this “women 
and peace hypothesis”, suggesting that women are expected to be more peace-oriented. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Stuhlmacher and Waters. ‘Gender Differences in Negotiation Outcome: A Meta-
Analysis’. Personnel Psychology 52, no. 3 (September 1999): 653–77. 
36 Hannah Riley Bowles. ‘Gender and Negotiation’. Psychology of Women Quarterly37, no. 1 
(2007): 80–96. Accessed April 27, 2016. 37!Hannah Riley Bowles. ‘Psychological Perspectives on Gender in Negotiation’. HKS Faculty 
Research Working Paper Series aOctober 31, 2012,. Accessed April 27, 2016.!
38 Audrey Nelson. ‘Can Men Play the Negotiation Game Better than Women?’. June 19, 2011. 
Accessed April 27, 2016 39!Ifat!Maoz. ‘The Women and Peace Hypothesis? The Effect of Opponent Negotiators’ Gender 
on the Evaluation of Compromise Solutions in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’. International 
Negotiation14 (July 4, 2009): 519–36.!
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Negotiating styles are divided into five general categories: value claiming, value 
creating, accommodating, compromising, and withdraw.40  These categories are general 
in the sense that it is possible to use multiple styles within one negotiation.  Value 
claiming is known as a “win-lose” strategy in which the negotiators attempt to get as 
much as possible and give up as little as possible.  Accommodating is the flip side of 
value claiming.  When a party adopts an accommodating strategy, they concede to the 
other party or parties and accept a lose-win outcome.  Negotiators may be forced to use 
this strategy when they posses no leverage and do not believe they can impact the 
situation or persuade their opponent. 
Value creative negotiation, which I term “collaborative negotiation”, seeks to 
create a “win-win” outcome that adds value to both parties.  This does not mean that 
neither party makes concessions, but rather that the overall outcome for each is positive, 
fair, and acceptable.  This is more commonly seen when parties work together to help 
each other because they care about the long-term relationship and have established trust.  
Next, negotiators use a compromising strategy when they are prepared to make some 
concessions in exchange for some gains.  This is similar, but different than value 
creating/collaborative strategies because the negotiator does not necessarily care about 
working together, but views the negotiation as an exchange. 
The essential portion of the case study is the qualitative analysis of female 
negotiation styles.  Therefore, the criteria for identifying these strategies must be clear 
and reasonably observable given the available information.  To identify value claiming 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Middle East (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014). 
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negotiation approaches, I use criteria developed by Brian Rathbun.41  The value-claiming 
negotiator will: 
• Demonstrate Pessimism.  Value-claiming negotiators will be pessimistic about the 
other party, overstating differences and obstacles between the two in order to 
drive a harder bargain.  This also has the effect of pressuring the other party to 
offer concessions first. 
• Act Coercively:  This may mean leveraging their position to extract greater 
concessions from the other party, demanding concessions before the negotiation 
begins, insisting the opponent concede first so as to have greater power, or 
holding an issue hostage as a bargaining chip. 
• Restrict Shared Information: The withholding of relevant information very 
commonly marks these negotiations.  Negotiators may lie or mislead the other 
party about their ability to concede or what they will accept so that the other party 
will believe they need to give more. This may result in brinkmanship plays, in 
which the negotiators threaten to walk-out, or in drawing “red lines” that are not 
reflective of their true positions. 
The accommodating negotiator will:  
• Negotiate from weakness 
• Concede first 
Value creating negotiators will: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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• View each other as partners:  In order to negotiate as partners, value-creating 
parties will signal optimism, resolve, and empathy.  Signals can be private or 
public, but public signals are stronger.  
• Share information:  They will generally be honest about their preferences because 
they trust each other. 
• Refrain from coercive methods:  The absence of coercive negotiating tactics 
purposefully demonstrates earnestness and trust to the other party. 
• Maintain flexibility:  Collaborative negotiators will not draw “red lines”, give 
ultimatums, or demand initial concessions because they make agreeing on trade-
offs harder.  Instead, they keep viable options available and on the table. 
The compromising negotiator will: 
•  “Split the Difference”:  Compromisers tend to see the fair solution as the one 
halfway between the two positions.  This can mean haggling over what is fair 
through reason and debate. 
• Take extreme positions: Sometimes negotiators will take a more extreme position 
in order to mislead the other party and get a more favorable outcome by “splitting 
the difference” 
Withdraw approaches are not truly an approach because the negotiator simply leaves the 
negotiation.  This criteria provides a consistent method with which to identify each 
woman’s negotiating style 
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Variables & Hypotheses 
 Based on the preceding analysis, I developed two hypotheses based on the realist 
and feminist traditions that will be evaluated based on the above criteria.  Both identify 
negotiation style as the independent variable and negotiation outcomes as the dependent 
variable.  Gender is an antecedent variable that influences the independent variable.  
Gender is not the independent variable because the phenomena being studied is the 
impact of collaborative negotiation styles, so gender fits better as an antecedent variable 
that influences the likelihood an individual has a collaborative style and because the 
outcome is directly influenced by negotiation style, and only indirectly by gender. 
In hypothesis 1, Realism predicts that, ‘Women and men in the international 
system are governed by the same objective laws, human nature, and pursuit of interests, 
so confrontational negotiation styles will dominate conflict negotiations, leading to the 
creation of winners and losers after a crisis’. 
 Hypothesis 2, based on feminist theory predicts that, ‘Women in world leadership 
tend to use more collaborative negotiation styles, resulting in a higher likelihood of 
mutually beneficial outcomes’.  
 
Methodology 
 One way of understanding the role that women play in international politics 
would be to test effect of gender on decision-making would be a quantitative analysis of a 
large data set of all female and male leaders.  With accurate data, this would theoretically 
allow us to detect gender differences in negotiation and draw implications for the 
international system.  It would be possible to determine leaders’ negotiation styles and 
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their outcomes.  Ideally, this analysis could control for variance across time, political 
affiliation, location, and regime type, among many other variables.  Unfortunately, this 
research design is difficult to accomplish.  It is hard to analyze the population of female 
leaders because there are so few.  According to the Pew Research Center’s analysis of 
United Nations data, there are only 18 female world leaders right now.  They also note 
that: 
Even while the number of female leaders has more than doubled since 2005, a 
woman in power is hardly the norm around the world. 63 of 142 nations studied 
by the World Economic Forum have had a female head of government or state at 
some point in the 50 years up to 2014, but in nearly two-thirds of those nations a 
woman was in power for less than four of the 50 years – including 11 countries 
(17%) where a woman led for less than a year.42 
 
There simply is not a large enough population to study with any real meaningfulness, 
since most of the women who have come to power have served very short terms.  This 
type of research cannot be done until there is substantial data that is large enough to yield 
representative results from the population.  Most importantly for the purposes of this 
project, however, is that to this author’s knowledge, there is not a dataset of negotiation 
styles of leaders. 
 Creating such a dataset would require robust discursive markers for male and 
female leaders across time and space. This would include using existing information to 
conduct a content analysis of speeches, negotiations, meeting minutes, and so forth, in 
order to determine negotiation styles and analyze outcomes. 
 While it is difficult and time-consuming to create such a dataset, we can take 
similar steps on a smaller scale by analyzing the discourse and decision-making of 
individual leaders through qualitative, case study analyses. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 ‘Number of Women Leaders around the World Has Grown, but They’re Still a Small Group’, 
Pew Research Center, July 30, 2015. 
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 To study the impact of female leadership on international politics, I will analyze 
case studies from the realist and feminist perspectives.  This research design cannot 
constitute a hypothesis test, but it can illustrate whether female leadership fits into the 
existing mindset of realism, or if changes need to be made to the realist theory as more 
women rise to world leadership.  Finally, this will result in greater understanding of 
gender differences in conflict negotiation.  I will then address suggestions for further 
research on the topic. 
 The case studies are Margaret Thatcher, Dilma Rousseff, and Angela Merkel.  
These were chosen to assess a range of leadership styles.  I attempted to select three cases 
along the spectrum of confrontational to collaborative reputations, which meant selecting 
a leader known for being cooperative, a leader known for being stubborn and aggressive, 
and a leader known for neither extreme to be the middle of the spectrum.  I chose not to 
analyze cases of male world leaders because there is a gap in the literature on female 
world leaders, while male world leaders have been the study of much research.  The 
female cases can be compared to realist theory, which resulted from men studying male 
leaders in international relations, therefore representing the male case. 
Merkel and Thatcher were chosen because they represent the extremes, while 
Rousseff seems to be near the middle of the spectrum. News media and scholars 
frequently cite Merkel as a collaborative, quiet, and uncharismatic leader, which is quite 
the opposite of most great power leaders.  Attempting to determine the impact of 
Merkel’s leadership style is worthwhile just because of her influence as a leader in 
Germany, the European Union, and the world, even if we cannot prove that it will apply 
for all female leaders.  The popular perception of Margaret Thatcher as the “Iron lady” 
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and her mixed legacy over the Falklands makes her a good subject for the confrontational 
end of the spectrum.  Dilma Rousseff of Brazil has also been called an “Iron Lady”, but 
her reputation is mixed and her calls for international, peaceful cooperation provide a 
worthwhile middle case.  These three cases provide a variety of examples through which 
the feminist and realist hypotheses can be assessed. 
 It is important to hold the assessment criteria constant across the three cases in 
order to have a similar estimation of each leader.  First, I assess how each rose to power.  
Knowing how a politician rises to power and from where she comes is important because 
it elucidates her psychology and outlook on political life.  It also helps to understand her 
actions once she becomes a world leader.  Second, I assess their overall negotiation style 
based on the public record of negotiations with other nations across different issue areas, 
including trade and conflict.  Finally, I assess one major conflict negotiation that each 
woman spearheaded on behalf of their country during their time as a leader.  This point is 
important because one cannot truly judge a negotiation under the direction of another 
actor.  For example, many people have suggested studying Hillary Clinton’s term as 
Secretary of State as a case.  However, because she worked in President Obama’s 
cabinet, her actions were at his direction at least some of the time.  While it may be useful 
to analyze her tenure in this position to estimate how she would operate as president, it is 
impossible to know which actions belong to her or to President Obama in this type of 
scenario.  Studying only women who have negotiated autonomously on the world stage 
helps to control for negotiation style as the independent variable.  In each case, I make an 
informed judgment about the woman’s negotiation style and its outcomes. 
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 In the following sections I use the negotiating criteria from the literature review to 
test the realist and feminist hypotheses.  I begin by assessing the general negotiation 
styles of the three women and the negotiation approach used in each specific negotiation 
case.  I apply a consistent, rigorous measure by using the same negotiating criteria in 
each case.  This method to determine whether the leader prefers a collaborative or 
confrontational style helps control for bias.  The cases are structured to assess early 
influences on negotiating style, international negotiation reputation, and an in-depth 
negotiation case.  Within each negotiation case, I apply Rathbun’s criteria to determine 
the approach by asking whether each woman approached the crisis negotiations with 
pessimism, drew red lines, and demonstrated collaborative techniques while refraining 
from confrontational tactics.  In Merkel’s case, I add a separate section on sharing 
information because her communication effort was highly significant to the particular 
case. 
 
I. Margaret Thatcher 
 This case study is important for a number of reasons.  First, Thatcher was one of 
the first female leaders in the Western world and therefore provides an illustrative 
example of a woman operating in a male dominated system.  Second, she is viewed as the 
antithesis of a collaborative leader because of her reputation for thriving in confrontation.  
Finally, as Tickner notes, “Critics [of feminist theory] will support their challenges by 
reference to female policymakers, such as Margaret Thatcher, Golda Meir, or Indira 
Gandhi, who, they claim, behaved exactly like men”.43  Therefore, the Thatcher case !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Ann J Tickner, Why Women Can’t Rule the World: International Politics according to Francis 
Fukuyama, (n.p., 1999). 381. 
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study directly addresses the objections of critics of feminist theory.  Thatcher will be 
collaborative if she approaches the negotiation without pessimism, shares information in 
good faith, refrains from drawing red lines, and attempts to build a mutually beneficial 
solution.  A confrontational negotiator will not demonstrate these behaviors. 
 
Early Influences 
 Margaret Thatcher’s background and rise to power provide an excellent starting 
point for analyzing her negotiation style, which tends to be confrontational.  She was 
born the second daughter of a middle class family and was profoundly influenced by her 
father, Alfred Roberts.  Her father instilled in her a love for reading nonfiction, a strict 
adherence to Methodist principles, and a deep sense of exceptionalism.  Thatcher herself 
references his words, “Never do things just because other people do them.  Make up your 
own mind what you are going to do and persuade people to go your way”44.  This self-
conviction became an integral part of Thatcher’s political style.  Campbell states that:  
Alfred gave his daughter… an exceptionally powerful moral sense. More than 
anything else in her political make-up, it was her fierce confidence that she knew 
right from wrong…. She believed absolutely in her own integrity and habitually 
disparaged the motives of those who disagreed with her.  This rare moral certainty 
and unreflective self-righteousness was her greatest political strength in the 
muddy world of political expediency and compromise; it was also her greatest 
weakness” 
 
Furthermore, her Oxford education in Chemistry allowed her to hone her work ethic, but 
failed to challenge her worldview.  Her education was dominated by scientific education, 
which gave her a “practicality of thought”, but by exclusively focusing on the sciences, 
her education lacked the training to understand other perspectives and resulted in “a lack 
of imaginative sympathy with other views and life-experiences which ultimately !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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restricted her ability to command support”45.  In short, she did not develop an ability to 
critically question her own beliefs or empathize with other perspectives and by limiting 
her education to the hard sciences, Thatcher’s confidence in her reasoning as infallible 
remained unquestioned.  At University, she did encounter liberal instructors and peers 
with opposing viewpoints, but she felt they were snobbish and ridiculous, which served 
to “confirmed her certainty that they were all wrong and reinforced her righteous sense of 
persecution”46.  Thatcher’s self-righteous belief in herself and her indomitable drive to 
realize her world vision laid the foundation for her “Iron Lady” reputation.  This 
approach to life was evident in her politics and especially in her negotiation style. 
 
International Negotiation Style 
 Thatcher’s approach to negotiation is mostly confrontational, but occasionally 
compromising.  An early example of this conflict negotiation style is Thatcher’s response 
to the Iranian members of the Democratic Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of 
Arabistan (DRFLA) who attacked the Iranian embassy in London and took hostages was 
resolute.  After the men took over the embassy, diplomatic channels were initiated 
between Tehran and London.  Although the Home Secretary, Willie Whitelaw, had 
official charge of the hostage situation and police actions, Thatcher stepped in.  While 
many leaders may have chosen to pursue a negotiation strategy pursuing a peaceful 
resolution, Thatcher immediately adopted a hard line approach.  She set a clear 
expectation to not negotiate with terrorists’ demands for safe passage out of Britain and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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sent a Special Air Force unit of the British Army into the Embassy to end the conflict 
through force.   
This approach is characteristic of Thatcher’s confrontational negotiation style that 
results from her black and white outlook.  She also used confrontational negotiation 
during the Coal Miners’ strike and the European Union Rebate debate, solidifying her 
international reputation for resolve and hard liner negotiating tactics.  The win-lose 
outcome from Thatcher’s confrontational negotiation strategy favored her in these cases, 
but sometimes the circumstances forced her to employ an accommodating strategy.  For 
example, her famous negotiation with Deng Xiaoping over the return of Hong Kong to 
the Chinese government resulted in the loss of British colonial control without the 
establishment of an independent Hong Kong.  Thatcher simply could not employ a 
confrontational approach because her electorate would not have supported a military 
conflict with China over Hong Kong and because the Chinese felt very strongly about 
regaining Hong Kong.  Therefore, she negotiated from an accommodating standpoint in 
order to maintain good relations with the rising economic power, which resulted in the 
“One Country, Two Systems” agreement that returned Hong Kong to China, while 
maintaining its free market and liberalist principles.  In retrospect, Thatcher expressed 
regret over the outcome.  This example serves to illustrate the pattern that when Thatcher 
could not employ a confrontational, win-lose approach, she begrudgingly accepted an 
accommodating, lose-win approach to negotiating, rather than considering a collaborative 
approach.  An accommodating strategy, which results in a lose-win outcome, is different 
from a confrontational approach, which results in win-lose, because a confrontational 
negotiator will seek to extract as much as they can from the other party, while an 
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accommodating negotiator will agree to concessions without gaining much in return.  
Thatcher’s choice to be an accommodating negotiator in this example suggests that she 
only perceived an outcome in which one party win and another loses.  Arguably, 
Thatcher may have missed out on more optimal outcomes by using such a dichotomous 
approach.  In order to better make that assessment, it is necessary to do an in-depth case 
study on one particular international conflict negotiation. 
The greatest challenge to Thatcher’s reputation as a coercive negotiator is the 
special relationship she inherited and then cultivated with the United States.  It is difficult 
to reconcile Thatcher’s “Iron Lady” reputation with the accusations of “dancing to 
Washington’s tune” and being “Reagan’s poodle”47.  Thatcher’s relationship with Reagan 
is the greatest challenge to the categorization of Thatcher as a confrontational negotiator 
because they worked together on many issues, both domestic and international.  If she 
demonstrated a true and consistent collaborative approach with the United States, or 
something close to it, then the assertion of Thatcher as a wholly confrontational 
negotiator would be seriously called into question. 
To examine this exception, I chose the Falklands case to study Thatcher because it 
contains numerous important elements.  First, it is an international security conflict 
negotiation, so it is a better example of a crisis negotiation with the potential to escalate 
to military conflict than trade or European Union debates.  Second, while the conflict is 
between the United Kingdom and Argentina on the Falklands, Thatcher also negotiates 
with President Reagan, which allows analysis of the “special relationship”.  This is 
important because the Thatcher-Reagan relationship is the greatest challenge to 
Thatcher’s confrontational style.  By studying the Falklands case, we can determine if the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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special relationship tempered Thatcher’s response in any way.  Third, it is a case in which 
Thatcher had many possible options for response, so we can analyze her choices within 
the international context.48  
 
The Falklands Case: 
 On Friday April 2nd, 1982 the Argentine Junta led by Leopoldo Galtieri invaded 
the UK-controlled Falkland Islands.  Amy Oakes argues that the invasion was a 
diversionary war meant to unite the Argentinian people under the military junta, which 
was struggling with opposition and dissent49.  Oakes says that Galtieri hoped to take 
advantage of the “widespread support” for retaking the islands on cultural and historical 
grounds, in order to stabilize the government, which had been suffering domestically 
because of its inability to end the devastating economic stagnation50.  She uses the Policy 
Substitutability model to argue that circumstances eliminated other options for Galtieri, 
such as repression and economic reform, making his best choice a diversionary 
spectacle51.  Oakes also convincingly argues that Galtieri exhibited psychological biases, 
convincing himself that the diversionary attack on the Falklands would succeed because 
the United States would prevent the United Kingdom from taking military action52. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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completely unnecessary, but the purpose of this investigation is to determine to what extent her 
response was confrontational or collaborative. 
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 How did Thatcher approach the negotiation? Even before the invasion, Thatcher 
was suspicious of the Argentinian Junta and demonstrated pessimism in the ongoing 
negotiations.  The United Kingdom had been negotiating on and off with the 
Argentinians on the Falklands issue since its settlement in 176453.  Galtieri became 
President of Argentina in 1981 and hinted at a possible invasion of the Falklands, but the 
British did not take it seriously.  Thatcher described the negotiations with Galtieri’s 
regime prior to the invasion by saying, “Cynically, the new Junta (Galtieri) continued 
negotiations for a few months”54.  Thatcher doubted that the junta would invade, but also 
distrusted their resolve in the negotiations.  Thatcher certainly approached the 
negotiations with little expectation of a positive outcome.  She stated that, “Diplomacy 
was becoming increasingly difficult.  The Argentinians had shown they were not above 
taking direct action”55 (referencing their military presence on another island).  Thatcher's 
suspicions of the regime led her to react extremely negatively to the invasion. 
 Additionally, Thatcher sent many signals of her distrust of Galtieri’s regime.  On 
April 3rd, the day after the invasion, Thatcher addressed the House of Commons saying, 
“I must tell the House that the Falkland Islands and their dependencies remain British 
territory. No aggression and no invasion can alter that simple fact. It is the Government's 
objective to see that the islands are freed from occupation and are returned to British 
administration at the earliest possible moment.”56   She essentially signaled to the 
international community and to Galtieri that she had no intent to pursue diplomatic 
efforts.  Her speech also denunciates Argentina as a violent aggressor violating !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Margaret Thatcher. The Downing Street Years. London: HarperPress, 2012 
54 Margaret Thatcher. The Downing Street Years. 176. 
55 Margaret Thatcher. The Downing Street Years. London: HarperPress, 2012. 176. 
56 Thatcher, Margaret. 1982. ‘House of Commons Speech: Falkland Islands’. Margaret Thatcher 
Foundation.  
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international law that should be punished, effectively eliminating any doubt that she 
believed negotiations were viable.  By signaling to the opponent, the public, and the 
international community that she was pessimistic towards the negotiations and distrustful 
of the regime, she further limited the potential of negotiations. 
After negotiations broke down, Thatcher did not expect the invasion, but her 
immediate instinct was the use of force.  Thatcher admits that her public commitment to 
avoiding the use of force until all diplomatic options were exhausted was superficial.  She 
describes her “short term diplomatic objective” as the need “to win our case against 
Argentina in the UN Security Council and to secure a resolution denouncing their 
aggression and demanding withdrawal.”57  It is important to note that her long-term goal 
was to keep the issue out of the United Nations as much as possible.58  This reveals that 
she used diplomatic and liberal rhetoric to secure legitimacy and legality for the military 
campaign, but was not committed to a long-term diplomatic strategy.  In her 
autobiography, she reflected on the diplomatic efforts saying, “Yet I could never afford to 
ignore the diplomatic effort because on its successful conduct rested our hard-won 
position of UN Security Council support for Resolution 502”, which clearly shows that 
the pursuit of diplomacy was superficial. 
When the task force was assembled and dispatched to the Falklands, Thatcher was 
deliberately ambiguous about how much she intended to use force.  She states: 
Some saw the task force as a purely diplomatic armada that would get the 
Argentinians back to the negotiating table.  They never intended that it should 
actually fight. I needed their support for as long as possible, for we needed to 
demonstrate a united national will both to the enemy and to our allies. But I felt in 
my bones that the Argentinians would never withdraw without a fight and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 Margaret Thatcher. The Downing Street Years. London: HarperPress, 2012. 182. 
58 Margaret Thatcher. The Downing Street Years. London: HarperPress, 2012. 
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anything less than withdrawal was unacceptable to the country and certainly to 
me.59 
 
She allowed her allies to assume the task force was a coercive diplomatic tool, perhaps 
for a blockade or a signal of determination to shake the Argentinians’ resolve, which 
would fall short of using force, but Thatcher fully intended to use it.  In fact, she outright 
preferred the use of force to the negotiating table. She summarized her feelings on 
negotiation in The Downing Street Years: 
I was under an almost intolerable pressure to negotiate for the sake of negotiation 
and because so many politicians were desperately anxious to avoid the use of 
force – as if the Argentinians had not already used force by invading in the first 
place.  At such a time almost everything and everyone seems to combine to 
deflect you from what you know has to be done.60 
 
This is a telling quote because it reveals that Thatcher truly never considered that the 
conflict could be resolved peacefully.  From the beginning, she was convinced that the 
only acceptable approach was military confrontation.  With these opinions, we can safely 
conclude that Thatcher had an overwhelmingly pessimistic view of the diplomatic 
negotiations with Argentina and the United States mediating through Reagan. 
 
 Did Thatcher use confrontational tactics?  While it is not clear that Thatcher 
drew red lines after the Argentine invasion, she did make a minimum requirement that 
Argentina withdraw from the islands under the threat of force.  Thatcher ended her 
address to the House of Commons stating:  
The people of the Falkland Islands, like the people of the United Kingdom, are an 
island race. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. They are 
few in number, but they have the right to live in peace, to choose their own way 
of life and to determine their own allegiance. Their way of life is British; their 
allegiance is to the Crown. It is the wish of the British people and the duty of Her !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Margaret Thatcher. The Downing Street Years. 183. 
60 Margaret Thatcher. The Downing Street Years. 213. 
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Majesty's Government to do everything that we can to uphold that right. That will 
be our hope and our endeavour and, I believe, the resolve of every Member of the 
House. 
 
By reinforcing her belief in the “British-ness” of the Falklands people and stating that her 
government will “do everything that we can” to protect, Thatcher signals to the Argentine 
Junta that she views the Falklands as part of the homeland.  The logical induction from 
this statement is that Thatcher intends to treat the Falklands as she would the home island 
of Britain, and not as a distant, unimportant island.  This is clearly a coercive tactic 
because she publicly states her commitment to retaking the islands.  This adds to the 
credibility of her threat by making her accountable to the press if she failed to follow 
through and protect the Falklands’ “right” to be British. 
 
 Was Thatcher collaborative?  To be a collaborative negotiation, Thatcher would 
have had to attempt to remain flexible by keeping options open and sharing information 
about acceptable outcomes. After the Argentinians invaded Thatcher could have chosen 
from numerous responses.  To name a few, she could give up the Falklands, open 
diplomatic negotiations, contact Galtieri personally, send military forces, initiate a 
blockade, attack Argentina, re-conquer the Falklands, or attempt to organize a 
multilateral response through the United Nations or the European Community.  However, 
Thatcher made her decision instantly and refused to budge.  Upon hearing that the 
Argentinian invasion was imminent, she said, “I could not believe it: These were our 
people, our lands. I said instantly: ‘if they are invaded, we have got to get them back’”.61  
She immediately authorized organizing a fleet to send to the Falklands and looking back 
in later years said, “It was my job as Prime Minister to see that [the fleet] got the political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Margaret Thatcher. The Downing Street Years. 179. 
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support they needed”.62  Rather than reaching out to Galtieri to attempt to prevent the 
invasion, Thatcher asked Reagan to implore Galtieri to reconsider and to make clear that 
the United States would not support Argentina.63  When Galtieri failed to be available to 
the president for four hours, Thatcher concluded, “He deigned to speak to the President 
only when it was too late to stop the invasion. I was told of this outcome in the early 
hours of Friday morning and I knew then that our last hope had now gone”64.  She also 
said in a speech to the Commons that Reagan’s words “fell on deaf ears”, suggesting that 
Galtieri could not be deterred.65  Thatcher had made up her mind about the invasion and 
what her response would be before it even took place. 
 President Reagan attempted to mediate the conflict in the hopes of avoiding the 
use of force, but Margaret Thatcher would not budge.  Reagan wrote in his diary, “The 
Royal Navy is sailing toward the Falkland Islands to oust Argentina… We have to find 
some way to get them to back off”.66,67 Reagan made a personal appeal to over the phone 
and reflected that, “Margaret heard me out, but, demonstrating the iron will for which she 
is famous, she stood firm.  I couldn’t persuade her to make a commitment not to 
invade.”68  Wapshott notes that, “The use of the word ‘invade’ rather than ‘reconquer’ 
was a revealing slip”69 Additionally, Thatcher demonstrates here that she had chosen to 
accept only one possible outcome from the crisis.  Reagan then sent Secretary of State Al 
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Haig to try to broker a peace between Argentina and the United Kingdom.  In his 
correspondence with Reagan, Haig assesses the likelihood of diplomatic outcomes, 
writing, “All in all, we got no give in the basic British position, and only the glimmering 
of some possibilities, and that only after much effort by me with considerable help not 
appreciated by Mrs. Thatcher from Pym.  It is clear that they had not thought much about 
diplomatic possibilities.”70  Thatcher was not negotiating collaboratively and does not 
attempt to maintain flexibility because she did demanded only one acceptable outcome 
throughout the entire crisis. 
The negotiations strained the friendship between Reagan and Thatcher because 
they could not agree on an approach, which further illustrates Thatcher’s iron negotiation 
style.  Wapshott summarized the relationship during the tense negotiation saying, 
“Reagan accepted her often sharp verbal assaults with equanimity, whereas Thatcher 
would brood for days upon the president’s words of caution, recklessly complaining to 
colleagues how she felt betrayed by him or how ‘ungrateful’ the president had been to 
ask her to compromise.”71  It is also important to note that Thatcher made her decision 
without consulting the U.S. president and did not “seek his approval or consent before 
making her decision to retake the Falklands by military force”.72  She had already 
decided to use force to retake the islands and would not even consider any other 
strategies.  This shows that she clearly did not even attempt to maintain flexibility in the 
conflict negotiations.  Her immediate instinct was to use force and she did not question 
her own decision throughout the 28 days between the invasion and the arrival of the task 
force to retake the islands. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Thatcher’s government attempted to talk her out of using force, but she would not 
be swayed.  She summed up their arguments and her response: 
It was also on Friday 2 April that I received advice from the Foreign Office, 
which summed up the flexibility of principle characteristic of that department. I 
was presented with the dangers of a backlash against the British expatriates in 
Argentina, problems about getting support in the UN Security Council, the lack of 
reliance we could place on the European Community or the United States, the risk 
of the Soviets becoming involved, the disadvantage of being looked at as a 
colonial power. All these considerations were fair enough. But when you are at 
war you cannot allow the difficulties to dominate your thinking: you have to set 
out with an iron will to overcome them. And anyway what was the alternative? 
That a common or garden dictator should rule over the Queen’s subjects and 
prevail by fraud and violence? Not while I was Prime Minister.73 
 
This statement shows her complete dismissal of other options and her black and white 
thinking about responding to Argentinian aggression.  Despite pressure from her Foreign 
Office, the United States, and the international community, Thatcher refused to remain 
flexible and only superficially pursued diplomacy. 
 In the Falklands case, Thatcher clearly uses coercive tactics, indicating a 
confrontational negotiating strategy.  She was intent on retaking the islands and the only 
acceptable outcome that would prevent the use of force was a full Argentine withdrawal.  
This is a clear example of demanding concessions before even entering negotiation.  
Furthermore, she demonstrates extreme pessimism about Galtieri’s intentions and never 
truly considers diplomacy or more collaborative approaches.  Nothing in Thatcher’s 
memoirs, autobiographies, or statements at the time indicates any sort of empathetic 
thinking towards Galtieri, but rather a black and white approach casting Argentina as the 
villain.  Additionally, Thatcher’s immediate decision to use force effectively limited any 
chance of a peaceful conflict resolution and undermined diplomatic negotiation. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 In this section, I addressed a female world leader with a confrontational 
reputation.  In the following section, I address a case that is situated between 
collaborative and confrontational, with some elements of both.  
 
II. Dilma Rousseff  
 I chose the Dilma Rousseff case study expecting it to be an example of a leader 
that falls somewhere in between collaborative and confrontational.  In this case, I assess 
whether Rousseff tends to use a collaborative or confrontational approach by using the 
same criteria as in the Thatcher case.  Rousseff will be collaborative if she approaches the 
negotiation without pessimism, shares information in good faith, refrains from drawing 
red lines, and attempts to build a mutually beneficial solution. 
 
Early Influences 
 Born to a Brazilian schoolteacher mother and an ex-communist Bulgarian, 
immigrant lawyer-entrepreneur father, Dilma Rousseff grew up as the second of four 
children in a household heavily influenced by European habits and marked by privilege.  
Rousseff’s father, Pedro Rousseff, changed his name from Petar Rúsev to adapt to 
Brazilian society, but initially faced discrimination as a foreigner.  Pedro Rousseff built a 
successful real estate company and provided his children with elite classical educations.  
Although there is mystery surrounding Pedro Rousseff, he was well connected in 
Bulgaria and likely fled Bulgaria for France and then Brazil because of his leftist political 
beliefs.  He left behind another family in Bulgaria without explanation and created a new 
life in Brazil, all the while maintaining a close relationship with famed Bulgarian poetess 
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Elisaveta Bagryana, a connection of immense pride and social implications for Dilma’s 
family.  The Rousseff family was privileged, upper middle class with access to elite 
society and elite schooling. Two years after her father’s death in 1962, Dilma switched to 
a public high school at the age of 17.   
Upon leaving this environment, Rousseff experienced a political awakening.  
According to recollections, she “quickly discovered that the world had no place for 
debutantes". 74   Apolo Heringer, Rousseff’s high school teacher, taught her about 
Marxism and founded COLINA, recruiting young people to fight against the military 
junta that had overthrown a democratically elected president.  The public high school 
introduced her to radical ideas and subversion, which she chose to embrace by becoming 
a guerilla activist, which was a bold move for the daughter of a wealthy family.  She 
chose to join COLINA (Comando de Libertação Nacional), after reading the influential 
Revolution inside the Revolution by Régis Debray.  COLINA was a guerilla group intent 
on implementing socialism through armed struggle, although it is unclear if Rousseff ever 
engaged in violence.  Rousseff joined the cause and became a “leading figure in VAR 
Palmares, a political-military organization of Marxist-Leninist partisan orientation”.75  
When she was prosecuted for her involvement, the prosecuting attorney nicknamed her 
“Joan of Arc of Subversion” while claiming that she masterminded the robbery of 2.5 
million USD from the governor of Sao Paulo.76  She was captured in 1970 and held for 3 
years, during which she was reportedly tortured.  Upon her release, she moved to Porto 
Alegre where she joined her guerilla husband, attained a degree in economics, and gave !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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birth to her only daughter.  Rousseff entered into the state of Rio Grande do Sul 
government five years after democracy was restored and rose quickly.  
 
International Negotiation Style  
Rousseff has demonstrated a collaborative negotiation style as President.  
Although Rousseff never held elected office until she was elected president in 2011, she 
has defied expectations that her inexperience would be a problem. During her campaign, 
Rousseff was criticized for lacking experience and many critics assumed that she also 
lacked the “political and negotiating skills necessary to work successfully with Brazil’s 
Congress, comprised of a coalition of 10 parties”.77  However, since then she has 
demonstrated a direct leadership style and a collaborative political style.  Rousseff has 
taken a no-nonsense approach to traditionally accepted corruption practices, firing six 
ministers within her first year in office, while also easing party tensions with rivals, 
reaching across party lines, and passing controversial environmental laws.78  These 
actions reveal her action-oriented, direct approach, while also demonstrating a preference 
for calculated collaborative politics. 
As president, she has developed a mixed reputation.  Brazilians have nicknamed 
her the “Iron Lady” of Brazil due to her Guerilla past, but she has also cultivated an 
image as “Mother of the Poor” by introducing economic reforms to bring millions out of 
poverty.79 80 Publicly, Rousseff is often compared to her predecessor because she lacks 
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his charisma and charming background story.  Additionally, “She is known for her 
brusque nature and has a reputation for publicly dressing down ministers”, which has 
earned her a formidable reputation.81   
However, rather than fully embracing an “iron” reputation, Rousseff attempted to 
soften her image.  At the beginning of her presidential campaign, the Brazilian news 
media noted that, “Ms. Rousseff has made some attempts to soften her image, replacing 
glasses with contact lenses, undergoing plastic surgery to her face, and adopting a 
different hairstyle”.  Her battle with lymphatic cancer also softened her image by 
generating sympathy.  This attempt to soften her image through physical changes is 
unusual and suggests that she does not desire a one-dimensional “iron”, or aggressive, 
reputation. 
On the international scene, Rousseff’s statements establish a strong preference for 
multilateralism, cooperation, and collaborative negotiations.  At the opening of the 69th 
UN General Assembly Debate, Rousseff made a number of statements suggesting her 
approach to international conflict.  She flatly condemned the use of force to resolve 
conflicts, stating: 
The use of force is incapable of eliminating the underlying causes of conflict. This 
is made clear by the persistence of the Question of Palestine; the systematic 
massacre of the Syrian people; the tragic national destructuring of Iraq; the 
serious insecurity in Libya; the conflicts in the Sahel; and the clashes in Ukraine. 
Each military intervention leads not to peace, but to the deterioration of these 
conflicts.82 
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In reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Rousseff said, “This conflict must be 
resolved, not precariously managed, as has been the case. Effective negotiations between 
the parties must lead to a two-State solution, with Palestine and Israel living side by side, 
in security and within internationally recognized borders”.83  She also said that when it 
comes to the Syrian conflict, “There is no military solution. The only solution is 
negotiation, dialogue, and agreement”. 84   Rousseff has continually stressed the 
importance of diplomatic negotiation and has consistently condemned the use of force to 
settle international disputes.  Miriam Saraiva argues that Rousseff is continuing the 
“Brazilian soft power tradition” of using persuasion rather than coercion to build 
international influence, which explains her focus on diplomacy and negotiation, and her 
avoidance of displays of hard power.   
This pattern suggests that while Rousseff is known for being tough and direct, she 
holds a core value of peaceful international resolution.  While this may seem to conflict 
with her guerilla history, it is important to note that her guerilla activities were in 
resistance to a violent military junta, so her desire to support a norm of peaceful conflict 
resolution is consistent with her early life.  In the following negotiation case, Rousseff 
demonstrates a peaceful and collaborative approach, leading to a mutually beneficial 
outcome for both parties. 
 
Brazil—United States Surveillance Negotiation 
 In September 2013, Edward Snowden revealed that the U.S. National Security 
Agency actively spies on foreign nations and their leaders, triggering a diplomatic crisis !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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between President Obama and President Rousseff.  Snowden revealed that the NSA had 
accessed Rousseff’s emails and data collected by what Rousseff called a “global 
electronic spying network”.  Essentially, the NSA was accessing data from companies, 
like Google and Facebook that store their data on Brazil within the United States, as well 
as monitoring world leaders’ personal devices.  President Rousseff met with President 
Obama in Panama City, Panama on April 11, 2015 to negotiate a resolution to the 
diplomatic crisis. 
 
How did Rousseff approach the negotiation?  The public revelation that the 
United States was spying on Brazil undermined Rousseff’s image domestically and 
internationally, and she initially reacted negatively.  She called for the United States to 
issue an apology and cease surveillance on all its allies.  She also canceled her upcoming 
state visit to Washington, D.C.  During her opening speech at the United Nations, she 
attacked the NSA surveillance programs saying:  
Meddling this way in the lives of other countries violates international law and is 
an affront to the principles that should govern relations among nations, especially 
allies…. The security of one country’s citizens can never be guaranteed by 
violating the fundamental human and civic rights of citizens in other countries. 
We have informed the U.S. government of our protest, demanding explanations, 
apology, and guarantees that these actions will not be repeated.85 
 
This is a significant condemnation of the United States, since it was not only an official 
statement, but also a statement made by the Brazilian president herself with essentially 
the entire world in the audience at the UN General Assembly.  Rousseff clearly sent a 
signal that the U.S. surveillance was not just a slip-up, but was a diplomatic crisis.   
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 Furthermore, Rousseff oversaw domestic and international proposals designed to 
prevent U.S. surveillance through her party.  Her domestic political allies introduced 
legislation that would limit the NSA’s ability to collect data by forcing major Internet 
companies to store Brazilian data within Brazil.  This provision was dropped from the 
final version but sent a strong signal to U.S. business interests. In April 2014, Brazil 
hosted the Net Mundial Conference on the “future of Internet governance”, which 
resulted in Brazil and Germany (another angered ally targeted by U.S. surveillance) 
proposed and passed the U.N. Resolution on online privacy, which says “that the same 
rights that people have offline must also be protected online”.86  These actions and 
statements suggest that Rousseff felt a strong distrust of the United States, even though it 
is an ally. 
 While Rousseff did not escalate the diplomatic crisis, she did keep Brazilian-U.S. 
relations “on ice” until 2014.87  This created leverage because Brazil is an important 
regional ally and trade partner to the United States.  According to Peter Meyer of the 
Congressional Research Service, “The United States and Brazil have traditionally 
enjoyed robust political and economic relations” and cooperation on issues such as 
security, racial inequality, trade, energy, and climate change.88  However, Meyer notes 
that international efforts to “punish” other nations have been an area of tension between 
Brazil and the United States because “[Brazil’s] aversion to sanctions and preference for 
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dialogue have led it to approach the issues much differently than the United States”.89  
Despite her harsh criticisms at the UN, Rousseff approved a memorandum resolving a 
cotton trade dispute with the United States in October 2014, appointed her former 
ambassador to the United States as the Foreign Minister, and stated in her January 2015 
inaugural address that “It is of great importance that we improve our relationship with the 
United States”. 90   Shortly after her reelection, she rescheduled the state visit to 
Washington, D.C., which she had canceled after the NSA leaks.  These actions suggest 
that President Rousseff and President Obama have been able to work together despite the 
diplomatic crisis.  While it is unclear whether Rousseff was pessimistic initially, it did not 
persist throughout the negotiation. 
 
 Did Rousseff use confrontational tactics?  Rousseff decidedly did not draw any 
red lines, but kept her options open.  Rousseff strongly condemned the NSA practices as 
an attack on democracy, asserting that, “In the absence of the right to privacy, there can 
be no true freedom of expression and opinion, and therefore no effective democracy”.91  
She also said, “Friendly governments and societies that seek to build a true strategic 
partnership ... cannot allow recurring illegal actions to take place as if they were normal. 
They are unacceptable”.92  While these statements are strong condemnations of U.S. 
actions, she does not demand any initial concessions or make any threats.  Rousseff 
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purposefully leaves her options open, which maintains her flexibility.  She could have 
broken off diplomatic contact, or demanded that the United States make a major trade 
concession, before Brazil would return to the negotiating table.  It is important to note 
that there have been many ongoing trade disputes between Brazil and the United States, 
such as the current ban on importing Brazilian beef, and Rousseff could have easily 
demanded an end to the ban.  Additionally, at the UN speech she said, “We have 
informed the U.S. government of our protest, demanding explanations, apology, and 
guarantees that these actions will not be repeated”.93  Rousseff returned to the negotiation 
table without a formal apology, although the White House did acknowledge their 
“regret”.  
 
 Was Rousseff collaborative?  The absence of red lines suggests a more 
collaborative approach in a tough diplomatic negotiation, but how does Rousseff fare 
under the collaborative criteria?  This criterion includes sharing information, refraining 
from coercive action, maintaining flexibility, and viewing each other as partners.  In an 
exclusive CNN interview with Christiane Amanpour, Rousseff explained the diplomatic 
back and forth between the two nations after the documents were leaked:   
So we of course we voiced that concern to President Obama at the time. What we 
told him was that every reciprocal act between Brazil and the U.S., which are 
major strategic partners; every such act would be impaired by information that we 
were not aware of was circulating out there.  We wanted two things from them.  
We wanted a guarantee that it would be discontinued and it would not happen 
again. And thus of course someone would have to be held accountable. Someone 
would have to come before us and tell us it would not happen again. 
 
At that point in time, the Obama administration was in the process of squaring the 
circle, if you will, around the issue of international spying activity. And they were 
not in a position to provide us with an answer at the time. And the guilty were not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in a position to provide us with an acceptable response at the time. We decided to 
discontinue the plans we had for the state visit of mine to the U.S.  That of course 
did not mean that we broke ties with the Obama administration, no. It only meant 
that we were placing all cards on the table very clearly. And say, hey, the way it 
is, it is impossible if it remains the way it is.  I think today, in hindsight, I think 
we have made quite a few steps.94  
 
Rousseff’s summary of the diplomatic back and forth between her administration and 
Obama’s reveals that Rousseff did act collaboratively.  She states that she placed “all 
cards on the table very clearly” because it would be “impossible” to repair the diplomatic 
relationship if the NSA surveillance continued.  This is a clear demonstration that 
Rousseff shared her preferences and bottom-line with administration while maintaining 
flexibility on what response she would accept.  This area is gray because she did initially 
demand an apology, which could be interpreted as a coercive demand for initial 
concessions.  However, the statement above shows that in private discussions, she and 
Obama shared information on what was internally feasible for each and found a mutually 
acceptable middle ground.  Rousseff recognized that “they were not in a position to 
provide us with an answer at that time”, which shows awareness of the U.S. domestic 
situation and willingness to be flexible so that both countries have a positive outcome.  
Rousseff has demonstrated information and preference sharing, as well as remaining 
flexible. 
 Rousseff and Obama also viewed each other as partners, rather than opponents, 
which shows a mutual collaborative approach to the negotiation.  Some might argue that 
since Rousseff did not receive a public apology or public guarantee that NSA 
surveillance would cease, she conceded to a stronger United States.  However, this 
ignores the private nature of top-level international negotiations.  Foreign Policy quoted a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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“well-placed official in the Brazilian government” who said that the “Rousseff-Obama 
rapprochement involved concessions from Washington” despite the appearance of 
Rousseff backing down because, “ “The American government’s posture did change. The 
[U.S.] president made it clear in his last conversation with Rousseff…that if he wanted to 
know something about Brazil or the president, he will call her and not use other 
means”.95  Additionally, President Obama has introduced a modest intelligence reform 
agenda, reformed agricultural agreements with Brazil, and initiated cooperation on 
numerous issues, such as education, social security, climate change, and 
nonproliferation.96 After their meeting in Panama, Obama stated that Brazil “is a global 
leader”, and since then Obama has globally recognized Brazil as a partner through many 
bilateral and multilateral agreements.97  Obama and Rousseff viewed each other as 
partners during the Panama City negotiation, which helped lead to a mutually beneficial 
outcome. 
 After the negotiation, both President Rousseff and President Obama benefitted.  
President Rousseff attained many new bilateral agreements with the United States, 
modest intelligence reform, an international image bolstered from the high profile 
negotiations, and a strengthened partnership with the United States.  President Obama 
repaired relations with Brazil without appearing weak to his domestic audience and 
ensured continued partnership with its main regional ally.  This mutually beneficial 
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outcome is the result of collaborative negotiation approaches that created value for both 
parties. 
 This section focused on a case that was selected based on being in the middle of 
collaborative and confrontational.  However, I found that Rousseff’s negotiation style 
was actually very collaborative, despite some elements of confrontational rhetoric.  In the 
next section, I address the case of Chancellor Angela Merkel, who is world renowned as 
a consensus builder.  I will use the same criteria as in the two previous cases to determine 
Merkel’s negotiation style. 
 
III. Angela Merkel  
 Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany, is the third case because she 
embodies the collaborative approach.  I chose this case to illustrate collaborative 
negotiation as the independent variable and mutually beneficial outcomes as the 
dependent variable. Because Merkel is the de facto leader of the European Union, her 
negotiations are high profile and have wide-reaching implications.  Therefore, a 
collaborative negotiation style will have consequences for European integration, the 
United States, and the international order in general.  Additionally, this case is important 
because it is the most likely to pose a challenge to the traditional realist view of power-
maximizing realpolitik.   
In this case, I use the same criteria to determine Merkel’s negotiation style as in 
the other two cases. I assess Merkel’s early influences, overall negotiating style, 
international reputation, and the negotiation style used in the Ukraine Crisis negotiation.  
The Ukraine Crisis tests Merkel’s collaborative reputation because she may be less 
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inclined to collaborate with President Vladimir Putin, who epitomizes confrontation.  
Merkel’s negotiation approach in the Ukraine Crisis negotiation will be collaborative if 
she approaches the negotiation without pessimism, shares information in good faith, 
refrains from drawing red lines, and attempts to build a mutually beneficial solution.  
 
Early Influences 
 In her early life, Merkel’s father and the East German political structure in which 
she grew up heavily influenced her.  When Merkel was an infant, Horst Kasner, her 
father, moved the family into East Germany because of his profound sense of duty as a 
Lutheran pastor.98  Kasner was known for his strong moral code, an emphasis on personal 
responsibility, and Protestantism, which he passed on to his daughter.  According to the 
BBC documentary “The Making of Merkel”, “Merkel's Socialist father held politically 
charged gatherings at his seminary and as she grew up, vigorous debates rang around the 
dinner table”. 99   Merkel grew up debating morality, spirituality, and the role of 
government in the individual’s life. 
 However, her father’s religious life put her in danger.  Merkel was vulnerable to 
suspicion because of her family’s background and her father subsequently encouraged 
her to join the Free German Youth program in order to deflect discrimination100.  
Merkel’s father and his choices effectively made Merkel an outsider and alienated her 
from her peers.  This sense of differentness is essential to understanding her character.  
Remarkably, Merkel did not resent this.  In fact, she said, “I have been shaped by my !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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parents and I am proud of that”101.  Differentness was an integral part of Merkel’s early 
years and was also imposed upon her by the East Germany social and political structure.   
 This sense of differentness grew because the communist rule in East Germany 
caused Merkel to develop a guarded and quiet personality.  As a child she preferred 
solitude, her teachers described her as, “Plain, quiet, and extraordinarily intelligent”, and 
she rarely took risks, instead preferring to stick to her routine.102  According to a peer, her 
nickname was “gray mouse” because of her quiet, unassuming nature.  The German 
Democratic Republic had a compounding effect on this introverted feature of her 
personality because of the danger of being identified as a political dissenter.  In a 1991 
speech, Merkel described how “the ability to read between the lines” had been crucial.103  
She also understood the necessity of, and even excelled at, “keeping her cards close” in 
the oppressive environment.  Merkel therefore grew up living a double identity.  One that 
accepted the regime’s ideology and lived unassumingly without political aspirations, and 
another that debated politics in secret, held western values of freedom, openness, and 
democracy, and desired to be an instrument of change for Germany.  Merkel’s introverted 
nature allowed her to have these two identities and deflect suspicion.   
To understand Merkel’s negotiation style, one must understand her introverted 
personality.  Introversion is thought to be a spectrum largely determined by genetic 
makeup.  In fact, Jerome Kagan was able to predict introversion and extroversion of 4 
month-old babies by predicting that those who were highly reactive to stimuli were 
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introverts and those who were low reactive were extroverts.104  When he studied the same 
subjects later in their life, this theory held up and the introverted subjects matched well 
with Carl Jung’s theory that an, “Introverted Attitude is characterized by an inward 
flowing of personal energy—a withdrawal concentrating on subjective factors. The 
introvert is usually happy alone with a rich imagination and prefers reflection to 
activity”.105  More recent science suggests that this is because, “Our preferences are 
shaped by the way our brains respond (with dopamine) to the world”, and introverts 
respond more, but less positively to social stimuli.106  
Introversion guides Merkel’s approach to international negotiation.  As a leader, 
Merkel is known to take sometimes excessively long periods of time to make decisions, 
meticulously consider all the facts, and painstakingly educates herself on a topic before 
taking a position.  This approach is characteristic of introverts, who prefer to make 
decisions alone and take more time contemplating options.107   Crawford and Czuczka 
state, “She is not given to snap, intuitive decisions, but is rather very deliberate in the 
way she reaches her conclusions”.108  This method fits Susan Cain’s description of an 
introvert’s complex problem solving when she concludes that, “Introverts think before 
they act, digest information thoroughly, stay on task longer, give up less easily, and work 
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more accurately”.109  Cain also notes that introverts tend to achieve better outcomes at 
complex problem solving, which means that Merkel’s decision-making is a strength in 
long-term problems, but that she may seem slow to action in a crisis.  She has also 
developed a leadership style that centers on cooperation, consensus building, and 
partnership.  An example is her negotiations with the former French President, Nicolas 
Sarkozy.  Initially Sarkozy would “Brandish any concession he had won from her, as she 
kept quiet”, but then he “realized he was making it more difficult for her to agree to 
crisis-fighting measures and revised his approach”.110   
Whereas Dilma Rousseff attempted to soften her “iron” image with physical 
changes, Merkel has embraced her quiet persona.  Merkel often wears the same outfit in 
different colors, and in general, usually looks the same.  She has had the same haircut, 
relatively, for her entire career.  She actually chose her signature diamond-shaped manner 
of holding her hands because she felt awkward in the public eye and did not know how to 
carry herself.  It is a neutral gesture and fits well with her “no frills” personality.  Like 
Rousseff, she lacks charisma, although for Merkel it is because of her introversion.  
Initially, she struggled with public speaking, felt awkward with her gestures, and 
preferred to remain out of the spotlight.  But as her career progressed, she overcame these 
problems by employing the “desensitization” method.  Susan Cain explains 
desensitization as tackling your fear or anxiety “one step at a time” and in low-
stimulation environments.111  This method requires a lot of preparation and practice, 
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which Merkel still uses before all of her speeches.112   Despite overcoming her fear of 
public speaking, Merkel still demonstrates introversion through her quiet public persona 
that avoids attention as much as possible. 
These presentations of herself reinforce her quieter, introverted power.  In a 2013 
article, Cameron Abadi argues that, “Angry protesters in Greece and Spain have tried to 
paint Merkel as a Nazi, but the Hitler moustache doesn’t quite stick; mostly they’ve 
directed their anger at their own governments. In some sense, Merkel has maximized her 
power by minimizing the appearance of it”.113  Much of his evidence is that she refrains 
from loud rhetoric and the appearance of pushing reforms on other Euro countries, and 
instead prefers to make decisions “behind the scenes” and with the other leaders.114  An 
anonymous longtime political associate said: 
She is a master of listening.  She gives everybody the feeling ‘I want to hear what 
you have to say,’ but the truth is that her judgment is made within three minutes, 
and sometimes she thinks another eighteen minutes are wasted time.  She is like a 
computer—‘Is this possible, what this man proposes?’ She’s able in a very quick 
time to realize if it’s fantasy.115   
 
By listening and analyzing other people and their ideas, Merkel gains the advantage of 
understanding the other person and critically assessing the objective merits of whatever 
they are proposing.  This is just one example of Merkel’s calculating political prowess.   
She also uses her unassuming body language to contrast herself against the 
machismo and charisma of leaders like President Obama or President Putin, who give 
rousing speeches with bold claims.  Her desire to stay out of the spotlight actually gives 
her power to build consensus and deflect responsibility for unpopular decisions.  Merkel !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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has described her style saying,  “I am regarded as a permanent delayer sometimes, but I 
think it is essential and extremely important to take people along and really listen to them 
in political talks”.116  Rather than attempt to mold herself into the traditional image of 
leadership and power, she has found a way to use her introverted, quiet nature to her 
advantage by being a consensus-builder. 
 
International Negotiation Style  
 In the international community, this method has earned Merkel a very 
collaborative reputation.  This reputation is certainly in part because of the nature of 
German politics.  The German parliamentary system is coalition-based, and the political 
culture values consensus and pragmatism.  Merkel must build consensus among her own 
party, the Christian Democratic Union party, and her coalition partners, the Social 
Democratic Party, on a regular basis.  Additionally, the electorate in Germany prefers a 
unifying, cautious, collaborative leader, which constrains Merkel from bold, assertive 
leadership.  She uses this same approach as the de facto leader of the European Union.  
For example, during the Greek economic crisis, Merkel worked to create a mutually 
acceptable solution to Greece’s debt problem that involved building consensus between 
the German politicians calling for Greece to exit the Eurozone and Prime Minister Alexis 
Tsipras and his ruling coalition, which was elected on an anti-austerity platform.  Despite 
the conflicting calls for bailouts, more austerity, Greek exit, and debt forgiveness, Merkel 
managed to reach a third bailout agreement to avoid a Greek exit from the Eurozone.117   
Marcel Fratscher, president of the D.I.W. Berlin think tank commented on Merkel’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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handling of the crisis, saying, “You couldn’t find her saying a bad word about Greece or 
anything populist, and even though German public opinion was very strongly in favor of 
a Grexit and no bailout deal.  They secured a deal with no Grexit.”118  Merkel’s managed 
a very dangerous crisis that had the potential to undermine the Eurozone with extreme 
caution.  As a consequence, Greece has remained part of Europe and seems to be on the 
recovery road, while Merkel avoided a full-scale bailout, maintained high approval 
ratings (65-70%), and gained a reputation for crisis management.119  
 
Ukraine Crisis—Merkel-Putin Negotiations 
 I chose Merkel’s ongoing negotiations with President Vladimir Putin of Russia 
because they provide a harder test of Merkel’s reputation for collaborative negotiation.  A 
skeptic might argue that it is easy and only natural for Merkel to be collaborative with her 
European partners, so this reputation is untested.  Therefore, studying how Merkel 
negotiates with the notoriously difficult Putin can address these critiques.  Additionally, 
this is a clear example of crisis conflict negotiating, since Putin’s invasion of Crimea 
surprised the international community and constitutes a militarized dispute. Finally, it is 
the single example of Merkel taking the lead in negotiating a crisis outside of the EU 
 Other world leaders, such as President George W. Bush and President Obama, 
have been somewhat mystified by Putin’s actions.  After meeting Putin for the first time, 
Bush said, “I looked the man in the eye. I was able to get a sense of his soul”.120  Yet 
relations deteriorated over U.S. perceptions of belligerent Russian foreign policy and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118 Irwin, Neil. ‘How Germany Prevailed in the Greek Bailout’. Europe (The New York Times), 
July 30, 2015.  
119 Bershidsky, Leonid. ‘Leonid Bershidsky’. February 2015. Accessed April 14, 2016.  
120 BBC. ‘Bush and Putin: Best of Friends’. BBC Europe (BBC News), June 16, 2001.  
! 59!
Russia’s control over oil reserves.121  In fact they deteriorated so much so that President 
Obama made a campaign promise to reset relations with Russia.  Merkel, on the other 
hand, is uniquely positioned to understand Putin. Noah Barkin explains: 
The German chancellor has never harbored any illusions about the former Soviet 
agent, nor hopes that she might change him. It is this hard-nosed realism, born of 
Merkel's own experience growing up in a Soviet garrison town in East Germany 
and reinforced over a turbulent 14-year relationship with Putin, that has earned 
her respect in the Kremlin and thrust her into the potentially risky role of chief 
mediator in the Ukraine crisis.122 
 
Merkel understands that she is dealing with a difficult negotiator who holds a worldview 
that is diametrically opposed to hers.  She also has no illusions of being able to control 
Putin.  However she still takes a collaborative approach, avoids escalation, and grinds the 
negotiation to reach a mutual outcome. 
 The Crimea negotiations did not take place in a vacuum, but rather many years 
into a somewhat tumultuous relationship between Merkel and Putin.  Merkel became the 
German Chancellor in 2005, but reports suggest that Putin and Merkel met as early as 
2002.  The first official meeting between Merkel and Putin was in 2007 at Putin’s Sochi 
residence, and it provides a perfect example of the 14-year relationship. Putin attempted 
to fluster and intimidate her during the meeting by unexpectedly bringing in his large, 
black dog “Konnie”.  It is well known that Merkel has a fear of dogs after being bitten by 
one in childhood; however, she adapted quickly and turned the tactic against him.  She 
stated to the press afterwards, "I understand why he has to do this — to prove he's a man.  
He's afraid of his own weakness. Russia has nothing, no successful politics or economy. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 Light, Margot. 2008. “Russian-american Relations Under George W. Bush and Vladimir 
Putin”. Irish Studies in International Affairs 19. Royal Irish Academy: 25–32.  
122 Barkin, Noah. ‘Cold War Past Shapes Complex Merkel-Putin Relationship’. Reuters. March 7, 
2014. Accessed April 14, 2016.  
! 60!
All they have is this”.123  Despite this provocative and overtly offensive tactic, Merkel 
remained unemotional and pragmatic about the necessity for diplomatic relations.  While 
their relationship has had obstacles, they have been able to work together.   
Merkel is actually one of the only Western leaders that managed to maintain a 
working relationship with Putin.  Arguably, her collaborative approach to dealing with 
him is likely the reason the two have been able to maintain a relationship, while other 
leaders, who reacted to Putin’s belligerence with aggression, have experienced worsening 
relations with Russia.  For example, relations under George W. Bush suffered due to 
Bush’s neoliberal foreign policy to remain the strongest military power and promote 
democracy, even through the use of force, in Russia’s geographic region. 
 
How did Merkel approach the negotiation?  Merkel was essentially thrust into 
the role of moderator between Russia and the United States due to Germany’s 
geopolitical position and because of her closer relationship with Putin.  She approached 
the negotiation fairly optimistically.  In initial September 2014 negotiations, Merkel took 
up the primary negotiating role with Putin, and the role of moderator between the West 
and Russia, with hopes of finding a diplomatic solution.  The crisis continued on and 
worsened with fighting breaking out after the first cease-fire (Minsk I) deal was signed 
and accusations that Putin was further provoking violence.  For example, U.S. Vice 
President Joe Biden publicly stated, “Too many times, President Putin has promised 
peace and delivered tanks” when asked about possible military responses to Russian 
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involvement in Ukraine.124  Despite the chaos, Merkel pursued a multilateral approach to 
negotiations.  Then, in the weeks leading up to the February 2015 negotiations, many 
U.S. politicians and even NATO’s top military commander, General Philip Breedlove, 
were calling to send arms and ammunition to the Ukrainian troops to better fight the pro-
Russian separatists.125  Merkel responded to these calls by denouncing military options 
and saying, “I cannot imagine any situation in which improved equipment for the 
Ukrainian army leads to President Putin being so impressed that he believes he will lose 
militarily.  I have to put it that bluntly”.126  Here she not only denounces trying to 
threaten Russia, but also reaffirms her belief in reasoning diplomatically with Putin.  
Instead of sending weapons, Merkel spent over 17 hours in negotiations that continued 
overnight with Russia and France in order to reach a cease-fire deal.127 Merkel managed 
to reach a cease-fire deal that prevented possible escalation between the United States 
and Russia, even if it was not an ideal agreement. 
 
Did Merkel use confrontational tactics?  Throughout the conflict, Merkel has 
been in consistent communication with Putin and the West.  Merkel has very clearly laid 
out her bottom-line position.  She flatly ruled out military options as a response to 
Russian actions in Crimea.128  This is a very important point, because by taking military 
options off the table, she reveals her position that despite the illegality of Russian military 
action, she will not support an escalation.  This is unusual in a militarized conflict !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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negotiation because the threat of force is commonly used to deter or intimidate an 
opponent from a course of action.  Merkel did not entertain the idea of using force, but 
very clearly explained that Russia’s actions would not be tolerated without consequence.  
Her transparent approach made it clear to all the nations involved that there would be no 
military escalation, but that Europe would not accept a Russia that would not adhere to 
international law.  Merkel clearly communicated the position that aggression would be 
met with sanctions to President Putin on numerous occasions, in person, and over the 
phone.129 
These are collaborative techniques, rather than extractive tactics, because they are 
used to communicate Germany’s true position.  Merkel is not drawing dishonest red lines 
in order to extract more from Putin in the negotiations, but rather she is unambiguously 
sharing her bottom-line, making this a clear example of honest information sharing. 
Furthermore, Merkel has made a point of maintaining flexibility.  She has kept channels 
of communication open throughout the crisis, rather than demanding initial promises or 
concessions from Putin before going to the bargaining table.  Additionally, by avoiding 
making grandiose public statements about the crisis and by keeping most of the 
negotiations’ content private, Merkel has maintained her flexibility.  According to a BBC 
report, “The fact that few details have been made public is probably positive. It suggests 
this is an attempt to negotiate seriously, without rhetoric and out of the public eye”.130  
This allows Merkel to keep more options on the table as negotiations progress, rather 
than trying to assert the outcome by eliminating options, which is a demonstration of 
collaborative negotiation. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Chancellor Merkel responded to a difficult opponent with caution, while avoiding 
confrontational tactics, like drawing red lines.  One of the biggest challenges Merkel has 
encountered in this crisis negotiation with Putin is the allegation from the United States 
that Putin encouraged the separatists to break the cease-fire agreement.  Many 
commentators, especially in the United States, saw this as evidence that Putin was 
enacting an increasingly belligerent and aggressive foreign policy.  Merkel responded 
without fear or promises of punishment, and she definitively avoided drawing red lines. 
Instead, she was purposeful and chose a balanced response, which she believed would be 
more likely to result in a positive outcome.  Merkel met with Putin in May 2015 and was 
careful to pay respect to the anniversary of mass Soviet losses in World War II.  Reports 
say that, “She joined Mr. Putin at a military wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier outside the Kremlin wall, walking behind slow-marching Russian 
soldiers”. 131  However, she was careful to balance this imagery with a thoughtful 
statement about the Ukraine crisis by saying, “We have sought more and more 
cooperation in recent years.  The criminal and illegal annexation of Crimea and the 
warfare in eastern Ukraine has led to a serious setback for this cooperation”.132 
 
Was Merkel collaborative?  Frankly, there is no better word to describe 
Merkel’s approach to even this highly contentious negotiation.  Merkel’s most consistent 
method in navigating the crisis has been partnership.  Building on an effort that 
originated during President George H. W. Bush’s administration, Merkel and Obama 
have cultivated a highly cooperative partnership.  The United States has encouraged !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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German leadership in this crisis and Merkel has been “careful to keep the American and 
the European positions close”.133,134 US-German relations are close, but have been 
plagued by the NSA spying scandal, in which it was revealed that the NSA had been 
recording Merkel’s phone calls for over a decade.135  However, Merkel has largely 
ignored the scandal, in favor of pursuing closer partnership with the United States, which 
she views as essential to the present Ukraine crisis and to the future in general.136  Merkel 
has worked tirelessly to collaborate with the rest of Europe as well.  Packer notes that she 
has been, “Staying in close touch with twenty-seven other leaders and understanding each 
one’s constraints.  For sanctions to bite, Europe had to remain united”.137 Merkel’s way 
through the crisis is not to escalate rhetoric or further militarize the conflict, but to 
implement sanctions in order to put pressure on Russia and wait for her opponent to fail.  
Even after approving sanctions against Russia, Merkel has made it a point to maintain 
open channels of communication with Putin.  Throughout the crisis “she remained careful 
to balance European unity, the alliance with America, German business interests, and 
continued engagement with Russia”.138 
 Despite the stubborn difficulty that Putin has presented to Merkel, she is careful to 
make every effort to find a mutually beneficial outcome.  A senior official in Merkel’s 
government described the ongoing talks; “Merkel can be tough to the point of 
unpleasantness, while offering Putin ways out of his own mess. Above all, she tries to 
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understand how he thinks”.139  This account depicts an intense effort to listen, understand, 
and find pragmatic solutions to resolve the conflict peacefully. 
With Russia now, when one feels very angry I force myself to talk regardless of 
my feelings, and every time I do this I am surprised at how many other views you 
can have on a matter, which I find totally clear. Then I have to deal with those 
views, and this can also trigger something new.140 
 
Merkel carefully navigated the tensions with Putin by empathizing with his worldview, 
rather than trying to manipulate or control him.  This is a clear demonstration of 
collaborative techniques, even in the face of a difficult opponent. 
 The outcome of these crisis negotiations is yet to be determined, but it is fair to 
say that Merkel has avoided military escalation and moved the negotiations to focus on 
diplomatic and economic solutions.  She was able to minimize the impact of worsening 
U.S.-Russian tensions by playing moderator, while uniting the European Union behind 
her approach.  This resulted in two Minsk agreements (September 2014 and February 
2015)141.  In combination with these agreements, Merkel led the West to implement 
sanctions with the goal of limiting Putin’s options in Ukraine by causing a domestic 
economic crisis, while falling short of threatening Putin’s legitimacy as president.142  
Additionally, Russian-controlled troops in Eastern Ukraine have ceased advancing and, 
“Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny has argued that without the sanctions, the 
Russian army would have invaded the southern part of Ukraine as far as Odessa”.143  
While Merkel’s approach has not entirely resolved the conflict at present, she has deftly 
managed the crisis with caution and pragmatism, while seeking to create a mutually !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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acceptable solution for Germany, Russia, the United States, Ukraine, and the entirety of 
the European Union. 
 
Implications & Future Study 
 After conducting three in-depth case studies of female world leaders, there are 
several implications.  I found that Thatcher is a confrontational negotiator, while 
Rousseff and Merkel are distinctively collaborative negotiators.  These findings pose a 
challenge to traditional realist theory.  Realism predicted in Hypothesis 1 that, ‘Women 
and men in the international system are governed by the same objective laws, human 
nature, and pursuit of interests, so confrontational negotiation styles will dominate 
conflict negotiations, leading to the creation of winners and losers after a crisis’.  
Although this was the case for Margaret Thatcher, Rousseff and Merkel did not fit into 
the realist mold.  For Rousseff and Merkel, Hypothesis 2 was a better fit.  Feminist theory 
predicted in Hypothesis 2 that, ‘Women in world leadership tend to use more 
collaborative negotiation styles, resulting in a higher likelihood of mutually beneficial 
outcomes’.   Thatcher does not fit into Hypothesis 2, but it is important to note that 
feminist theory predicts a tendency, not an absolute pattern.  While proponents of realism 
may argue that it also predicts tendencies, Merkel and Rousseff pose a significant 
challenge to the realist perspective, suggesting that realism fails to account for differing 
perceptions of “interests”, human nature, and power as an objective category. 
 The case studies suggest that realism fails to account for gender differences.  The 
Merkel case especially illustrates this.  Merkel does not only use a collaborative approach 
when dealing with routine negotiations or allies, but employs collaborative negotiation 
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even when dealing with Putin, who is widely regarded as a belligerent, aggressive actor 
in the international system.  This behavior directly contradicts realist expectations, based 
on Morgenthau’s principles, because Merkel is not pursuing interests in terms of power, 
or behaving in the way Morgenthau’s assessment of human nature predicts.  Therefore, 
Merkel exemplifies how different negotiation styles can have different outcomes. 
Another implication is that as more women enter politics and rise to the top 
leadership positions, a shift towards collaborative negotiation is likely to intensify.  
However, more information and research is necessary on the subject.  One area for future 
study would be researching the timing of entering a political system.  While Thatcher, 
Rousseff, and Merkel all rose up in male-dominated domestic political systems, Thatcher 
was much earlier than the other two and likely experienced a more male-dominated 
international system than Rousseff or Merkel currently do.  The timing variable could 
provide a possible explanation for the vast difference in negotiating styles.  Another 
alternative explanation could be that a growing trend towards international integration 
and cooperation results in the selection of more collaborative leaders. 
 It would also be worthwhile to study the impact of domestic political institutions 
on collaborative and confrontational approaches to international relations.  An argument 
could be made that Putin benefits domestically from an aggressive international stance, 
while Merkel benefits from being the consensus-builder, so an important future step for 
the study of gender differences would be a study that accounts for the two-level 
interaction of domestic and international politics. 
 One limitation of my study is that negotiation approaches can differ based on the 
situation.  For this reason, I assessed the overall negotiation style of each leader before 
! 68!
each in-depth negotiation case.  However, there is the possibility that another negotiation 
case would have yielded different conclusions about each woman, so it is necessary to 
recognize the situational influences.  Furthermore, negotiation approaches and styles are 
learned and leaders can adapt and change.  Since Merkel and Rousseff are both current 
leaders, their styles may change in the future. 
 
Conclusion 
 While this research cannot draw decisive conclusions about the impact of women 
as world leaders in crisis negotiations, it contributes important insights into the changing 
international political system and the value of collaborative negotiation.  While gender 
differences play a role in determining aggregate differences in negotiation styles, it is 
essential to note that a collaborative negotiation style tends to lead to better outcomes 
than confrontational styles, for all involved in a crisis negotiation.  For example, Prime 
Minister Thatcher confrontational style strained her relationship with President Reagan 
by weakening his influence in Latin America, and her military defeat of Argentina in the 
Falklands resulted in President Galtieri being removed from power.  On the other hand, 
Chancellor Merkel’s collaborative management of the Ukraine Crisis has managed to 
avoid stand offs and Merkel, Obama, and Putin have all remained in power.  In short, 
collaborative negotiation styles result in creating value through collective empowerment 
for all parties involved, and therefore deserve more emphasis in the field of international 
relations.  
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